Abstracts

Duncan Large, University of East Anglia, England

This paper looks at the reception of logical positivism in the English-speaking world from the linguistic point of view. The inter-war Vienna Circle had a major impact on the development of English-language philosophy, but this was largely in the absence of published English translations. Many key essays appeared in English only well after the War – e.g. Otto Neurath’s “Protokollsätze” (Protocol Sentences, 1932) first appeared (in a translation by George Schick) in A.J. Ayer’s 1959 anthology Logical Positivism, too late for W.V. Quine, who uses a quotation from Neurath’s German original as an epigraph for his Word and Object the following year – and the Circle’s 1929 manifesto “Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis” (The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle) was first published in English translation as late as 1973. Before the rise of Nazism forced many of the key figures in the Vienna Circle to emigrate to Britain and the USA and begin lecturing and publishing in English, English-language philosophers like Ayer and Quine had studied logical positivism in Vienna – a testament to the continuing importance of the German language within philosophical research (and the social and natural sciences more generally) in this period. In my paper I want to consider: the extent to which English-language philosophers were engaging with Vienna Circle ideas in German; the importance of popularisations of logical positivism by English-speaking philosophers; the history of English translations of Vienna Circle writings, and the nature of those translations. Finally, I will briefly consider the role of translation within the philosophy of logical positivism itself.

Den Wiener Kreis übersetzen

Dieser Beitrag befasst sich mit der englischsprachigen Rezeption des logischen Positivismus aus sprachlicher Perspektive. Der Wiener Kreis der Zwischenkriegszeit hatte einen großen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der englischsprachigen Philosophie, aber dies geschah weitgehend in Ermangelung von veröffentlichten englischen Übersetzungen. Viele wichtige Abhandlungen erschienen erst lange nach dem Krieg auf Englisch – Otto Neuraths „Protokollsätze“ (1932) erschien z.B. erstmals (in einer Übersetzung von George Schick) in A.J. Ayers Sammelband Logical Positivism (1959), zu spät für W.V. Quine, der im folgenden Jahr ein Zitat aus Neuraths deutschem Original als Epigraph für sein Word and Object (1960) verwendet – und das Manifest „Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis“ (1929) wurde erst 1973 in englischer Übersetzung veröffentlicht. Bevor der Aufstieg des Nationalsozialismus viele der Schlüsselfiguren des Wiener Kreises dazu zwang, nach Großbritannien und in die USA auszuwandern und auf Englisch zu lehren und zu publizieren, hatten englischsprachige Philosophen wie Ayer und Quine den logischen Positivismus in Wien studiert, was die anhaltende Bedeutung der deutschen Sprache innerhalb der philosophischen Forschung (und den Sozial- und Naturwissenschaften im Allgemeinen) in dieser Zeit bezeugt. In meinem Beitrag möchte ich untersuchen, inwieweit sich englischsprachige Philosophen mit den Ideen des Wiener Kreises in deutscher Sprache auseinandersetzten, welche Bedeutung die Popularisierung des logischen Positivismus durch englischsprachige Philosophen hatte, wie die Geschichte der englischen Übersetzungen von Schriften des Wiener Kreises verlief und wie diese Übersetzungen beschaffen waren. Abschließend werde ich kurz die Rolle der Übersetzung innerhalb der Philosophie des logischen Positivismus selbst betrachten.

Variations on the task of the translator

Helena Martins, PUC-Rio, Brazil

Walter Benjamin’s philosophical statement on the task of the translator, as voiced in his celebrated 1923 homonymous essay, finds echoes in two vibrant and otherwise very diverse contemporary responses to the question of translation – two approaches whose strengths I wish to combine here. The first is that developed by Canadian writer, essayist, and translator Anne Carson, who, to give but an example, prefaces her (controversial) translation of Sophocles’ Antigone with a text suggestively entitled “the task of the translator of antigone”. The second is to be found in Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s account of what he construes as an Amerindian theory of translation, also alluding to Benjamin’s repertoire for comparison. I shall consider how the philosopher’s reflections on translation are inventively taken up in each case, with emphasis on the ways Carson and Viveiros de Castro associate the circumstance of translation with the emergence of, respectively, catastrophe and equivocation. I shall then examine a few acts of translation extracted from Carson’s and Viveiros de Castro’s writings: as I intend to show, presented as acts of translation, they are prone to give rise to perplexities that are comparable to the baffled reactions Friedrich Hölderlin’s translations have sparked among his contemporaries, long before Benjamin set up the German poet’s translating strategies as a veritable paradigm for the task of the translator. In my effort to approximate and compare theoretical and practical aspects of translation that are brought to our attention by Walter Benjamin, Anne Carson, and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, I take occasion to reflect on the possibilities and implications of a perspectivist philosophy of translation.

Variações sobre a tarefa do tradutor

A reflexão filosófica de Walter Benjamin sobre a tarefa do tradutor, conforme expressa em seu célebre ensaio homônimo de 1923, encontra ecos em duas reações contemporâneas vibrantes e muito diversas à questão da tradução – duas abordagens cujas forças desejo combinar aqui. A primeira é aquela desenvolvida pela escritora, ensaísta e tradutora canadense Anne Carson, a qual, para dar apenas um exemplo, prefaciou sua (controversa) tradução da Antígona de Sófocles com um texto sugestivamente intitulado "a tarefa do tradutor de antígona". A segunda pode ser encontrada na apresentação que o antropólogo brasileiro Eduardo Viveiros de Castro faz sobre o que interpreta como uma teoria da ameríndia da tradução, também aludindo ao repertório de Benjamin para efeito de comparação. Considerarei as formas como as reflexões do filósofo sobre a tradução são inventivamente retomadas em cada caso, com ênfase nos modos como Carson e Viveiros de Castro associam a circunstância da tradução, respectivamente, à catástrofe e à equivocação. A seguir, examinarei alguns atos de tradução extraídos dos escritos de Carson e Viveiros de Castro: como pretendo mostrar, apresentados como atos de tradução, eles estão propensos a dar origem a perplexidades comparáveis ??à estupefação provocada pelas traduções de Friedrich Hölderlin entre seus contemporâneos, muito antes de Benjamin estabelecer as estratégias de tradução do poeta alemão como um verdadeiro paradigma para a tarefa do tradutor. Em meu esforço para aproximar e comparar aspectos teóricos e práticos da tradução trazidos à nossa atenção por Walter Benjamin, Anne Carson e Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, vejo ocasião para refletir sobre as possibilidades e implicações de uma filosofia perspectivista da tradução.

Translation as a form of recognition of recurrence

Aleks Trklja, University of Birmingham, England

In the present paper, I want to propose that translation is as a form of recognition of recurrence. The notion of recognition of recurrence was introduced by Salmon (2012) and was further developed in Fine (2007) and Soames (2015). In brief, it will be argued that when a speaker translates an expression (or a sentence) from language A to language B she recognizes different occurrences

of that expression (or the sentence) as presenting a single content. It will be proposed that the types of recognition of recurrence which are involved in translation have the form of quotation (understood in Davidson’s terms (1968)). The following three forms of quotation a

-when a translator renders an expression (or a sentence) from language A into language B she quotes the author of the source text;

-when a translator renders an expression (or a sentence) from language A into language B she quotes other speakers of language B;

-when a translator renders an expression (or a sentence) from language A into language B she quotes other translation of that expression (or the sentence).

The notion of translation as quotation was previously explored in the relevance- theoretic approach (Wilson and Sperber, 1986; Gutt, 1990, 2014). But, this approach covers only the first kind of quotation and contextualizes it in terms of the speaker’s intention. In contrast, in the view proposed in the present paper, quotation is not regarded as a property of intention but as a property of the translator’s inferential cognitive ability to recognize recurrence.

References

Davidson, D. (1968) ”On saying that.” Synthese, 19: 130-146.
Fine, K. (2007) Semantic Relationism. Malden MA: Blackwell.
Gutt, E. (1989) ”Translation and relevance.” PhD diss., University of London.
Gutt, E. A. (2014) Translation and relevance: Cognition and context. Routledge.
Salmon, N. (2012) ”Recurrence.” Philosophical Studies 159:407–41.
Soames, S. (2015) Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (1986) Relevance: Communication and cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Translation als recognition of recurrence

Im vorliegenden Beitrag werde ich behaupten, dass Übersetzung eine Form der recognition of recurrence ist. Der Begriff der recognition of recurrence wurde von Salmon (2012) eingeführt und in Fine (2007) und Soames (2015) weiter ausgearbeitet. Ich werde vorschlagen, dass es sich bei der Übersetzung eines Ausdrucks (oder eines Satzes) von Sprache A nach Sprache B um das Wiedererkennen der verschiedenen Vorkommen dieses Ausdrucks (oder des Satzes) als einen einzigen Inhalt handelt.

Als Argument wird angeführt

-wenn eine Übersetzerin einen Ausdruck (oder einen Satz) aus Sprache A in Sprache B überträgt, zitiert sie die Autorin des Ausgangstextes;

-wenn eine Übersetzerin einen Ausdruck (oder einen Satz) aus Sprache A in Sprache B überträgt, zitiert sie andere Sprechende der Sprache B;

-wenn eine Übersetzerin einen Ausdruck (oder einen Satz) aus der Sprache A in die Sprache B überträgt, zitiert sie andere Übersetzungen dieses Ausdrucks (oder des Satzes).

Der Begriff der Übersetzung als quotation wurde zuvor mittels der relevanztheoretischen Betrachtungsweise untersucht (Wilson und Sperber, 1986; Gutt, 1990, 2014). Dieser Ansatz deckt jedoch nur die erste Art der quotation ab und kontextualisiert es insbesondere in Bezug auf die Absicht der Sprechenden. Im Gegensatz dazu wird in der hier vorgeschlagenen Sichtweise die quotation nicht als das Merkmal der Intention betrachtet, sondern als eine Eigenschaft der inferentiellen kognitiven Fähigkeit der Übersetzerin, Rekursionen zu erkennen.

Literaturliste

Davidson, D. (1968) ”On saying that.” Synthese, 19: 130-146.
Fine, K. (2007) Semantic Relationism. Malden MA: Blackwell.
Gutt, E. (1989) ”Translation and relevance.” PhD diss., University of London.
Gutt, E. A. (2014) Translation and relevance: Cognition and context. Routledge.
Salmon, N. (2012) ”Recurrence.” Philosophical Studies 159:407–41.
Soames, S. (2015) Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (1986) Relevance: Communication and cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Translation as a test for the explicit-implicit distinction

Francesca Ervas, University of Cagliari, NIAS Amsterdam

Translation has been used as a test to identify lexically ambiguous words (Zwicky & Sadock 1975): the failure of one-to-one translatability would prove the existence of a genuine ambiguity in the meaning encoded in the original sentence. Kripke (1979) extended the test to identify any “semantic or (syntactic) ambiguity”. Following Grice (1975), he distinguished between what words mean and what the speaker meant, by using those words in a given context. For instance, the sentence “Where is the bank?” may have different meanings in different contexts, but this is a matter of difference in words’ meaning, not in speaker’s meaning. We might find it to be differently translated into another language. It is not the same case for a sentence with a definite description as in: “The murderer of Smith is insane”, where the referential vs. attributive use is a difference in terms of speaker’s meaning. We should not expect to translate it into other languages.

Voltolini (2009) proposed to generalize Kripke’s test, arguing that a linguistic phenomenon in the original text is genuinely semantic if it can be solved through translation, forcing the translator to choose between two different senses in the words of another language. A linguistic phenomenon would be instead genuinely pragmatic if it can be preserved in translation. I will argue that translation does not work as a test to distinguish between semantic and pragmatic phenomena, but it can instead work as a test for the distinction between explicit and implicit phenomena of meaning. The difference between the original and the alternative translations is indeed the result of a change in the degree of explicitness in translation. What is crucial to translation is that languages differ in the strategies used to make meaning explicit, in both its pragmatic processes of enrichment and impoverishment (Carston 2002; Ervas 2014). These processes draw information, not only from the original sentence, but also from the context.

La traduzione come test per la distinzione tra significato esplicito vs. implicito

La traduzione è stata usata come test per identificare termini lessicalmente ambigui (Zwicky & Sadock 1975): il fallimento della traducibilità uno-a-uno proverebbe l’esistenza di una ambiguità di significato nell’enunciato originale. Kripke (1979) ha utilizzato il test per identificare una qualsiasi “ambiguità semantica o (sintattica)”. Seguendo Grice (1975), Kripke distingue tra significato delle parole e significato inteso dal parlante con quelle parole in un contesto. Per esempio, la frase “Where is the bank?” può avere significati diversi in contesti diversi, ma si tratta di una questione di differenza nel significato delle parole, non nel significato del parlante. Potremmo tradurla in modi diversi in un’altra lingua. Non è così per la frase contenente una descrizione definita “The murderer of Smith is insane”, dove la differenza tra uso referenziale e attributivo della descrizione sta nel significato del parlante. Non dovremmo aspettarci di tradurla in modo diverso in altre lingue.Voltolini (2009) ha proposto di estendere il test di Kripke, sostenendo che un fenomeno linguistico sia genuinamente semantico se può essere risolto attraverso la traduzione, costringendo il traduttore a scegliere tra due diversi significati nelle parole di un’altra lingua. Un fenomeno linguistico nel testo originale sarebbe invece genuinamente pragmatico se può essere conservato nella traduzione. Sosterrò che la traduzione non funziona come test per distinguere tra fenomeni semantici e pragmatici, ma che può invece funzionare come test per la distinzione tra fenomeni di significato esplicito vs. implicito. La differenza tra una traduzione dell’originale e quella alternativa è il risultato di un cambiamento nel grado di esplicitezza della traduzione. Ciò che è cruciale per la traduzione è che le lingue differiscono nelle strategie utilizzate per rendere esplicito il significato, in entrambi i processi pragmatici di arricchimento e impoverimento (Carston 2002; Ervas 2014). Questi processi fanno uso di informazioni che provengono non solo dall’enunciato originale, ma anche dal contesto.

Can a philosophical tradition arise out of translation?

Jonathan Egid, King’s College London, England

In this talk I explore a suggestion made by Claude Sumner in the first of his five-volume Ethiopian Philosophy, that philosophy in Ge’ez, the literary language of Christian Ethiopia, begins with the of creative reappropriation of Greek and Arabic philosophy through a process of translation. Sumner argues that far from being passive transmissions or merely faithful renderings of foreign texts and ideas into Ge’ez, these works are transformed in the process, acquiring a distinctively Ethiopian character. I explore this proposal with particular reference to the idea of a ‘conceptual vocabulary’ – to the set of philosophical terms of art not found in ordinary language, or extended beyond their ordinary use – and its development in a new language: how does it become possible for philosophy to speak Ge’ez, and how does Ge’ez become a medium for philosophising? How does philosophical reflection enrich the language, and what does philosophy gain from being planted in this new linguistic soil?

I contrast the case of the development of Ge’ez philosophy from translation with a more familiar case: the emergence of philosophy in the vernacular languages of Europe, in particular in English. I argue that the cases are much more similar than meets the eye: we can, and should see the emergence of conceptual vocabularies in the English vernacular as having arisen from sustained contact with practises of translation, and in debates over the methodology and aims of philosophical translation. I conclude with some general observations about the history and future of philosophical translation, and the value of studying philosophy composed or translated into lesser-known languages.

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Untranslatability and the ethics of pause

Lisa Foran, University College Dublin, Ireland

The untranslatability debate has tended, as debates usually do, to divide into two sides. On the one hand, there is the claim that the whole idea of untranslatability is problematic since it sentences translation to failure from the outset. According to this line of reasoning, untranslatability misconstrues the process of translation: it makes us think that translation transposes an easily detachable signified from signifier. When this process of separation and re-insertion to another tongue fails in the experience of the untranslatable, it is translation itself that has failed. Thus, for proponents of this argument against untranslatability, such as Ricoeur or Venuti, we would do better to recognise translation as a complex interpretative act which never simply transposes an ideal signified but rather recreates signification each time anew in translation – as such nothing is untranslatable. On the other hand, there are those that claim that untranslatability is a fact of language; the claim is that certain languages unfold the world in such a way that they cannot be translated into anything other than a shoddy reflection of the original’s greatness. Here translation is a failure because linguistic uniqueness carries national, philosophical, and political force. This ‘ontological nationalism’ as Cassin calls it is found from Sapir & Whorf to Fichte or Heidegger. I would argue that it has also been cropping up in different guises in some of the worst kind of recent nationalist political rhetoric.

In this paper I argue, following Derrida and diverting from Cassin in certain respects, that untranslatability is the very condition of translation. Untranslatability is not ‘overcome’ or dealt with in translation but rather triggers translation itself, it remains in the source text after translation re-invoking translation over and over again. It arises in a different way in the translation. Untranslatability is both a mundane and a central feature of all texts. It is the breath before the choice of word is made, the slight pause of consideration, the ‘no, no, not quite that, more this’ that accompanies the translator or interpreter’s work. It is the interruption demanding respect that places ethics at the heart of translation. As such, the untranslatable allows us to think the ethics of intersubjective relations as requiring an appreciation of what remains radically unknowable in the other person.

Between ‘Körper’ and ‘Leib’: Foucault’s idea of the body after Nietzsche in Surveiller et punir

Melissa Pawelski, University of Warwick, England

In Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison (1975), Foucault conceptualises the body as a ‘surface d’inscription’, or historically legible object bearing the signs of regimes of power. From the available terms in French, Foucault chose ‘corps’ to theorise this development. Whilst ‘corps’ is an uncomplicated word to translate into English, Foucault’s German-language translator Walter Seitter had available to him ‘Körper’ and ‘Leib’. The first stems from the Latin corpora, and the second derives from Middle High German ‘Leib’, meaning ‘life’, ‘person’, ‘body’. Both are used in everyday language and they often are synonyms. In Surveiller et punir, Seitter rarely translates ‘corps’ as ‘Leib’, but in his translation of Foucault’s essay ‘Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire’ (1971), he mostly translates ‘corps’ as ‘Leib’. In a personal e-mail exchange Seitter justified this choice by arguing that Nietzsche does not, in his view, propose a new theory of the body, nor does Nietzsche fundamentally undo previous theories. Thus, the semantic difference does not matter for reading Foucault. Seitter states that ‘Körper’ and ‘Leib’ can easily be considered synonyms in philosophy. Still, it remains the case that Nietzsche distinguished between the two ideas of the body and this must be taken seriously for translating philosophy. The way in which Nietzsche’s vocabulary prioritizes the body, to dismantle the efforts of rationalistic philosophy and even religion, disappears in French and English translation. This paper will show, by way of examples, that the idea of the Nietzschean ‘Leib’ shines through Foucault’s analyses. The different bodily figures in Surveiller et punir, namely ‘le corps supplicié’, ‘le corps exposé’, ‘le corps docile’, and ‘le corps du délinquant’, can be theorised as bearing features of the Nietzschean 'Leib' as the element that has been seized by emerging forms of biopolitical management that understand the body as scientific object and machine to be put to economic use. But what does it change if Nietzsche's vocabulary neither becomes visible in Foucault's own writings nor in translation into other languages? Seitter reflects on the influence of Nietzsche and Kant on Foucault (2009) and argues, in much the same way as Derrida asks how to render ‘l’effet de pluralité’ in translations of multilingual texts (1987) or as Rée who insists on the importance of ‘past linguistic interactions’ (2001), that contemporary thinkers are free to use past concepts in ways they see fit. For the translator, this relativises the significance of past ideas and leaves room for a philosophical judgment, as Seitter has proposed. But even if we accept Seitter’s argument, translation still can expose the debates on the body: if we follow Foucault in his Nietzschean approach, the body poses important political questions of subjection that translation can help clarify.

Entre ‘Körper’ et ‘Leib’: L’idée du corps chez Foucault après Nietzsche dans Surveiller et punir

Dans Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison (1975), Foucault conçoit le corps comme une ‘surface d’inscription’, ou un objet historique intelligible portant les signes du pouvoir. Parmi les termes qu’il utilise dans son français original, Foucault choisit ‘corps’ pour théoriser ce développement. Si ‘corps’ n’est pas difficile à traduire en anglais, le traducteur de langue allemande Walter Seitter pouvait choisir entre ‘Körper’ et ‘Leib’. Le premier terme provient du mot latin corpora, alors que la deuxième dérive du moyen-haut-allemand désignant ‘vie’, ‘personne’, ‘corps’. Dans le langage commun, ils sont souvent synonymes. Dans Surveiller et punir, Seitter traduit rarement ‘corps’ par ‘Leib’. Toutefois, dans sa traduction du texte de Foucault ‘Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire’ (1971), il traduit notamment ‘corps’ par ‘Leib’. Dans un échange de correspondance électronique, Seitter se justifie en soutenant que Nietzsche ne propose ni une nouvelle théorie du corps ni ne défait les fondements des théories précédentes. La différence sémantique n’importerait donc pas pour lire Foucault. Seitter constate que ‘Körper’ et ‘Leib’ peuvent facilement être considérés comme des synonymes en philosophie. Toutefois, il n’en reste pas moins que Nietzsche les distinguait et cela doit être pris en considération. La façon dont Nietzsche privilégie le corps, afin de défaire les travaux de la philosophie rationnelle et même de la religion, disparaît dans les traductions anglaise et française. Cette contribution montrera, à titre d’exemples, que l’idée du ‘Leib’ se lit clairement dans les analyses foucaldiennes. Les différentes figures corporelles, notamment ‘le corps supplicié’, ‘le corps exposé’, ‘le corps docile’ et ‘le corps du délinquant’, peuvent être conçues comme portant les caractéristiques de l’idée du ‘Leib’ comme l’élément qui a été saisi par les formes émergentes de gestion disciplinaire et biopolitique. La question est donc de savoir ce que change si le vocabulaire de Nietzsche ne peut être montré ni dans les écrits de Foucault ni dans la traduction anglaise ? Dans un chapitre récent (2009), Seitter commente – tout comme Derrida s’interrogant sur ‘l’effet de pluralité’ dans les traductions multilingues (1987) ou encore Rée insistant sur l’importance des ‘past linguistic interactions’ (2001) – l’influence de Nietzsche et Kant sur Foucault en proposant que les philosophes sont libres de se servir des idées comme bon leur semble. Pour le traducteur, cela relativise la signification des idées passées et laisse place aux jugements philosophiques comme Seitter en a proposé. Cependant, même si nous acceptons sa thèse, la traduction peut néanmoins exposer des débats autour du corps : si nous suivons Foucault dans sa démarche nietzschéenne, les différentes idées du corps permettent de s’interroger sur des formes d’assujettissement politique que la traduction peut aider à éclaircir.

Not just words: Balancing efficiency and integrity in translation

Michela Bariselli & Sarah Fisher, University of Reading, England & University of Vienna, Austria

The reformulation of linguistic material within or between languages has important implications for meanings, interpretations, and worldly (inter)actions. The linguistic resources available to us when we engage in such translations can be inadequate. On one hand, they can be ‘gappy’, lacking expressions for particular informational contents. On the other hand, they can be ‘burdened’ with unwanted information. For example, many languages grammatically require gender inflections, forcing the transmission of (binary) gender identity information.

Whether faced with voids or burdens, translators must make strategic – and sometimes ethical – decisions about which words to use. We believe such decisions centrally involve balancing two dimensions of linguistic communication. Considerations of communicative efficiency urge the translator to exploit existing linguistic norms, to maximise the ease of communication. Considerations of expressive integrity, however, call for minimal distortion of the information to be transmitted. The demands of communicative efficiency and expressive integrity often pull in opposite directions, exacerbating the ‘linguistic inadequacy’ problem described above.

In this paper, we develop a typology of strategies to address this problem, ranging from relatively moderate linguistic refinements (in light of the philosophical literature on conceptual engineering and hermeneutical injustice), to those which involve more radical reorganisations of linguistic resources (inspired by discussions of ‘minor literatures’). Through the analysis of a series of case studies, taken from real-world, literary, and experimental domains, we consider how each approach in our typology balances the tension between communicative efficiency and expressive integrity. We conclude with brief remarks about the applicability of different translation strategies in different contexts.

Parole giuste: Tra efficienza e integrità nella traduzione

La rielaborazione di materiale linguistico all’interno di una stessa lingua o tra lingue diverse ha un ruolo chiave nella trasmissione e interpretazione di significato e nelle nostre (inter)azioni. Le risorse linguistiche a disposizione dei traduttori sono però spesso inadeguate. Da un lato, possono essere ‘lacunose’, prive di espressioni per determinati contenuti informativi. Dall’altro, possono essere ‘eccedenti’, trasmettendo informazioni non volute. Ad esempio, molte lingue richiedono inflessioni di genere, forzando la trasmissione di informazioni di identità (binaria) di genere.

Di fronte a lacune o eccessi, la traduzione richiede decisioni di tipo strategico – e a volte etico – riguardanti le parole da utilizzare. Questo studio mostra che tali decisioni devono bilanciare due dimensioni della comunicazione linguistica. Considerazioni sull’efficienza comunicativa spingono a sfruttare le norme linguistiche per massimizzare la facilità della comunicazione. Considerazioni sull’integrità espressiva richiedono di minimizzare la distorsione delle informazioni da trasmettere. Efficienza comunicativa e integrità espressiva spingono spesso in direzioni opposte, inasprendo così il problema dell’inadeguatezza linguistica.

Questo studio propone una classificazione delle strategie per affrontare questo problema, che spaziano da aggiustamenti linguistici relativamente moderati (alla luce del dibattito filosofico sull’ingegneria concettuale e sull’ingiustizia ermeneutica) a più radicali riorganizzazioni delle risorse linguistiche (ispirate da discussioni su ‘letterature minori’). Attraverso casi di studio provenienti da situazioni reali, dall’ambito letterario e da esperimenti mentali, consideriamo come le potenziali soluzioni bilancino la tensione tra efficienza comunicativa e integrità espressiva. Concludiamo il contributo con brevi considerazioni sull’applicabilità delle strategie di traduzione in diversi contesti.

Translators of philosophy as agents of dis/continuity

Mikael Evdokimov, University of Viuenna, Austria

In his paper on the existence of a “world philosophy”, Russian philosopher Andrej Smirnov, himself a translator of the Islamic philosophy into Russian, argues with a “tradition of thought” (russ. мыслительная традиция) to describe philosophical cultures in terms of their mutual hermeneutic otherness, incomprehensible without translation. Reflections on a “tradition” in the context of philosophical translations can also be found in the work of a number of Anglophone philosophers, whereas several translation scholars’ thoughts on the interface between translation and philosophy can be regarded as implicative of a “tradition”. Drawing upon the concept’s varying usage contexts, the paper aims to operationalize it in terms of translatological applicability. Accordingly, the notion of tradition will be split up into multiple continuities on the levels of philosophical discourse, text and terminology, or, in broad outline, into the continuity of a philosophical question, that of a reference field and that of semantics. The continuities, reminiscent of Walter Benjamin’s “afterlife” and Jacques Derrida’s “trace”, will be comprehended as inherently discontinuous, thus allowing for translators of philosophy to be conceptualized as agents of dis/continuity. The assumption being that dis/continuation is a hidden agenda of every translator of philosophy or an inevitable condition of any philosophical translation, the paper seeks eventually to underpin and exemplify its arguments by focusing on the first translation of Heidegger’s “Being and Time” into Russian (1997) by Vladimir Bibikhin and the controversies of its reception. His afterword comments on his translation decisions place the first Russian Heidegger into a continuity frame reaching out to contemporary Russian/Soviet philosophers, back to “translation rules” of the inventors of the Cyrillic alphabet, Saints Cyril and Methodius, and forward to the speculative realism.

ÜbersetzerInnen der Philosophie als AkteurInnen der Dis/Kontinuität

In seinem Beitrag über die Existenz einer „Weltphilosophie“ operiert der russische Philosoph Andrej Smirnov, der selbst arabische Philosophie ins Russische übersetzt, mit dem Konzept einer „gedanklichen Tradition“ (russ. мыслительная традиция), um hermeneutische Andersheit philosophischer Kulturen und den Translationsbedarf für deren Verstehen zu beschreiben. Überlegungen zur „Tradition“ im Kontext philosophischer Übersetzungen sind auch bei mehreren englischsprachigen Philosophen zu finden, während auch einige translationswissenschaftliche Aussagen zum Verhältnis zwischen Translation und Philosophie eine „Tradition“ zu implizieren scheinen. Ausgehend von diesen variierenden Verwendungskontexten des Traditionsbegriffs, wird im Beitrag vorgenommen, diesen zum Zweck der translatorisch-translatologischen Anwendbarkeit in multiple Kontinuitäten auf den Ebenen von Diskurs, Text und Terminologie bzw. in die Kontinuität einer philosophischen Fragestellung, die eines Referenzfeldes und die der Semantik aufzuspalten. Dem Kontinuitätsgedanken, der nach Walter Benjamins „Fortleben“ und „Nachreife“ sowie Jacques Derridas „Spur“ anmutet, wird hierbei eine innewohnende Diskontinuität vorausgesetzt. Demnach treten ÜbersetzerInnen der Philosophie als AkteurInnen der Dis/Kontinuität auf, und das Dis/Kontinuieren wird als ein verdecktes Gebot oder eine unvermeidliche Bedingung jeder philosophischen Übersetzung angenommen. Die Argumentation wird abschließend am Beispiel der ersten Übersetzung von Heideggers „Sein und Zeit“ ins Russische (1997) und ihrer umstrittenen Rezeption veranschaulicht und untermauert. Denn der erste „russische Heidegger“ wird von seinem Übersetzer Vladimir Bibikhin durch dessen Nachwortkommentare in einen Kontinuitätsrahmen verlagert, der sich auf moderne russisch-sowjetische Philosophen erstreckt, auf die „Übersetzungsregeln“ der heiliggesprochenen Entwickler des kyrillischen Alphabets Kyrill und Method zurückgreift und dem spekulativen Realismus vorauseilt.

Linguality and the untranslatable: Toward an ordinary languages philosophy

Nikki Ernst, University of Pittsburgh, USA

In her introduction to the Dictionary of Untranslatables, Barbara Cassin accuses “analytic philosophy” of construing English as the language of “common sense and shared experience” that serves to give expression to a universal logic. The aim of this talk is to investigate the pull of this accusation as it relates to the purported universalism in Cassin’s principal target – namely: Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP), as a spectrum between Austin and Wittgenstein. OLP’s “militant insistence on ordinary language” allegedly generalizes its investigations of one vernacular over language as such, thereby promoting ordinary English as the source language of universal concepts fit for (dis)solving deep philosophical problems.

In order to assess Cassin’s accusation, I will frame it in terms of a failure to do justice to the ‘linguality’ (Sprachigkeit) of OLP’s own observations. That is, OLP fails to appreciate the extent to which a linguistic structure is assignable to a concrete langue à la Saussure, all while failing to critically challenge the assumption that these kinds of assignments will unambiguously be possible. In questioning the essentially monolingual picture of linguistic structures ‘belonging’ to a specific language, ‘linguality’ undermines the underlying picture of ‘a language’ as a discrete, unified system enabling linguistic interactions within its borders.

By appealing to Post-Cavellian readings of Austin and Wittgenstein, I aim to integrate these insights on linguality into the method of OLP. Underlying this project is the assumption that philosophizing from the standpoint of ordinary language use within different speaker communities means charting the conceptual differences between different languages, all while rejecting a picture of ‘languages’ as monolithic conceptual schemes. In a word, this talk contends that any Ordinary Language Philosophy will have to be an Ordinary Languages Philosophy, situated at the intersections of multiple lingualities.

Sprachigkeit und das Unübersetzbare: Für eine Philosophie der Alltagssprachen

In ihrer Einleitung zum Dictionnaire des Intraduisibles wirft Barbara Cassin der „analytischen Philosophie“ vor, das Englische als die Sprache von „common sense and shared experience“ zu konstruieren, die einer universellen Logik Ausdruck verleiht. Das Ziel dieses Vortrags ist es, Cassins Vorwurf auf den Universalismus hin zu untersuchen, der ihrem prominentesten Ziel innewohnen soll – nämlich: der Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) als Spektrum zwischen Austin und Wittgenstein. OLP steht im Verdacht, ihre Untersuchungen einer einzigen Alltagssprache über Sprache überhaupt zu generalisieren und somit das alltägliche Englisch als Quellensprache universaler Begriffe zu stilisieren, die zur (Auf-)Lösung philosophischer Probleme taugen.

Um Cassins Vorwurf nachzuvollziehen, lese ich ihn als Kritik der Unfähigkeit von OLP, der ‚Sprachigkeit‘ ihrer eigenen Untersuchungen gerecht zu werden. Mit anderen Worten: weder erfasst OLP, inwiefern sich eine linguistische Struktur einer Saussure’schen langue zuordnen lässt, noch hinterfragt sie die Annahme, dass eine solche eindeutige Zuordnung überhaupt möglich sei. Indem er das essenziell monolinguale Bild der Zugehörigkeit von linguistischen Strukturen zu einzelnen Sprachen anzweifelt, untergräbt der Begriff der Sprachigkeit das zugrundeliegende Bild ‚einer Sprache‘ als diskretes, einheitliches System, das linguistische Interaktionen innerhalb seiner Grenzen ermöglicht.

Mithilfe Post-Cavell’scher Lesarten von Austin und Wittgenstein werde ich Sprachigkeit in die Methode von OLP integrieren. Diesem Projekt liegt die Annahme zugrunde, dass das Philosophieren vom Standpunkt der Alltagssprache das Skizzieren begrifflicher Unterschiede zwischen verschiedenen Sprachen erfordert, gleichzeitig aber das Bild von ‚Sprachen‘ als monolithischen Begriffsschemata ablegen muss. Kurzum: ich schließe, dass jede OLP eine Ordinary Languages Philosophy sein muss, die an den Schnittstellen mehrerer Sprachigkeiten situiert ist.

Rigor in translation theory: Vagueness before exactitude

Paulo Oliveira, State University of Campinas & University of São Paulo, Brazil

If we understand that translation pertains to the domain of language use, as Calzada Pérez (2003: 2) points in her discussion of ideology and power relations; and if we think that there should be a coherent relation between a conception of language and a respective theory of translation, in the sense of Kopetzki’s review of philosophy of language and the dispute ‘universalism vs. relativism’ (1996: 19-42); then we shall also take the next logical step and mobilize a ‘transcendental argument’ to state that a conception of language is logically prior to any theory of translation, thus making a test of compatibility to verify the strength of both: 1) if a theory of translation is compatible with its (declared or implicit) underlying conception of language; 2) if this conception of language allows for an adequate description of real language use. Some translation scholars as Toury (2012: 69-70), Tymozko (2014) and Wilson (2016) have already pointed at the productivity of Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘family resemblance’ for dealing with translational questions. Wittgenstein (2009) showed that many concepts of natural languages are intrinsically vague, e.g. ‘field of vision’; ‘etc.’; psychological concepts like ‘memory’ and ‘expectation’. Discussing the concepts of ‘game’ and ‘number’, he also argued —against Frege’s ideal of exactitude— that vagueness precedes exactitude, whose limits are established within the different ‘language games’ we play in our ‘forms of life’. Wittgenstein’s use of ‘analogical relations’ to find ‘intermediary links’ (Zwischenglieder) that allow a ‘surveyable representation’ (übersichtliche Darstellung) of actual language use has also an inextricable dimension of vagueness. Stecconi states that “difference, similarity, and mediation” are at the foundation of translation, also posing that “the notion of similarity [is] intractable is its vagueness; yet the character is fecund, and productive precisely because of this” (Stecconi 2004: 8-9). The perception of ‘similarity’ depends on comparison, based on commensurability criteria via analogy: Wittgenstein’s ‘vision of aspects’ (2009); Ricœur’s ‘construction of the comparable’ (2011). Oliveira (2019) poses that Toury’s vector of ‘adequacy’ (to the source text) is of analogical nature, operating across distinct language and cultures, whereas ‘acceptability’ (in the target culture) deals (digitally) with differences within the systems of the target culture themselves. I here propose we can and should apply Tymoczko’s notion of ‘*translation’ (building up on Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblance’) in a broader sense, so that ‘*translation’ is to be understood not only as a ‘language game’ in itself, but also as a ‘move’ in more complex language games within larger discursive practices. Wittgenstein’s distinct uses of the concepts ‘understanding’ and ‘translation’ offer a starting point to illustrate this argument.

Stringenz in der Übersetzungstheorie: Unbestimmtheit vor Genauigkeit

Sollten wir verstehen, dass Übersetzung im Sprachgebrauch stattfindet, wie Calzada Pérez (2003: 2) in ihrer Diskussion über Ideologie und Machtverhältnisse ausführt; dass eine kohärente Beziehung zwischen Sprachauffassung und entsprechender Übersetzungstheorie —im Sinne von Kopetzkis Ausführungen zur Sprachphilosophie um den Streit ‚Universalismus vs. Relativismus‘ (1996: 19-42)— nötig ist; dann sollten wir auch den nächsten logischen Schritt wagen und ein ‚transzendentales Argument‘ mobilisieren zu behaupten, dass Sprachauffassung logisch vor Übersetzungstheorie steht. Ein Kompatibilitätstest wäre dann durchführen, um die Stringenz beider zu überprüfen: 1) Ist die Übersetzungstheorie mit ihrer (deklarierten oder impliziten) zugrunde liegenden Sprachauffassung kompatibel? 2) Ermöglicht diese Sprachauffassung eine angemessene Beschreibung des tatsächlichen Sprachgebrauchs? Übersetzungswissenschaftler:innen wie Toury (2012: 69-70), Tymozko (2014) und Wilson (2016) wiesen schon auf die Produktivität von Wittgensteins Begriff ‚Familienähnlichkeit‘ für die Behandlung von Übersetzungsfragen. Wittgenstein (2009) zeigte, dass viele Begriffe natürlicher Sprachen intrinsisch vage sind, z. B. ‚Sichtfeld‘; ‚usw.‘; psychologische Konzepte wie ‚Gedächtnis‘ und ‚Erwartung‘. Ausgehend von ‚Spiel‘ und ‚Zahl‘ argumentierte er auch (gegen Freges Ideal der Genauigkeit), dass Vagheit der Genauigkeit vorausgeht, wobei die Grenzen letzterer erst in den verschiedenen ‚Sprachspielen‘ unserer ‚Lebensformen‘ festgelegt werden. Wittgensteins Suche nach ‚analogen Verbindungen‘ zur Feststellung von ‚Zwischenglieder‘, die eine ‚übersichtliche Darstellung‘ des aktuellen Sprachgebrauchs ermöglichen, hat ebenfalls eine unausweichliche Dimension der Vagheit. Nach Stecconi bilden „Differenz, Ähnlichkeit und Vermittlung“ die Grundlage der Übersetzung. Auch sei ‚Ähnlichkeit‘ wegen ihrer Vagheit unbehandelbar, dennoch sei sie gerade deswegen fruchtbar und produktiv (Stecconi 2004: 8-9). ‚Ähnlichkeit‘ wird mittels analoge Vergleichskriterien ermittelt: Wittgensteins ‚Aspekt sehen‘ (2009); Ricœurs ‚Aufbau des Vergleichbaren‘ (2011). Nach Oliveira (2019) sei Tourys Vektor der ‚Angemessenheit‘ (zum Ausgangstext) analoger Natur, da es über Sprach- und Kulturunterschiede vermittle, während ‚Akzeptanz‘ (in der Zielkultur) digital mit Unterschieden innerhalb der Systeme der Zielkultur selbst operiere. Ich verstehe, dass Tymoczkos Begriff ‚*Übersetzung‘ (ausgehend von Wittgensteins ‚Familienähnlichkeit‘) in einem erweitertem Sinne anwenden ist, so dass ‚*Übersetzung‘ nicht nur als ein eigenständiges ‚Sprachspiel‘, sondern auch als ein ‚Zug‘ in komplexeren Sprachspielen innerhalb größerer diskursiver Praktiken zu verstehen ist. Wittgensteins unterschiedlicher Gebrauch der Begriffe ‚Verstehen‘ und ‚Übersetzen‘ liefert einen Ausgangspunkt zur Veranschaulichung dieses Arguments.

Davidson on indeterminacy and ‘passing theories’: Need translators worry?

Piers Rawling, Florida State University, USA

Donald Davidson claims that ‘there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed’. Should this be a concern for linguists? I shall argue not.

Davidson’s argument rests on the idea that, when we depart from our past linguistic usage, we remain interpretable (he uses malapropisms as an example). Thus, he claims, our successful linguistic interactions do not depend on a learned set of conventions – such conventions, then, are not, pace the traditional view of language, required: ‘we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by appeal to conventions’. What we have are mere ‘passing theories’ of interpretation of one another, which we stand ready to modify with each conversation.

In a different context, Davidson proposes a thought experiment involving ‘radical interpretation’, where the radical interpreter begins with no understanding of her interpretee. He argues that interpretation in such a circumstance is possible, and asks how. Given that radical interpretation is possible, however, this might be taken to bolster the case against conventions: there are none initially known to the radical interpreter. But while this is true, I shall argue that appeal to conventions is crucial to the enterprise of radical interpretation nonetheless: that the radical interpreter doesn’t know what conventions her interpretee is following at the start does not entail that the interpretee is not following conventions.

In addition to arguing in favour of conventions, I shall also address another potential worry for linguists: the idea that interpretation is indeterminate. Here too I shall attempt to defuse the worry, and tie it in with Davidson’s claim that intentions are crucial to meaning, which he makes in the context of his argument against language.

In sum, then, I shall present arguments against Davidson’s ideas that there is no such thing as a language, and that meaning is indeterminate.

What is arch-translation?

Salah Basalamah, University of Ottawa, Canada

Translation studies has recently undergone some very deep developments that may lead this discipline—for the most—to an implosion, or—for the least—to a radical restructuration. Although in line with a general trend in other epistemic cultures towards more encompassing theorizing scopes, the evolution of the last years is, in either case, moving the translation concept to be identified in an increasing number of fields of knowledge and hold a greater role in shaping the way reality is constructed. Whether the concept of translation is seen as a sociological mechanism (Bourdieu, Luhmann, ANT) or as the epitomization of unbalanced linguistic, cultural and/or legal power relations (postcolonialism) or even as a metaphor for various phenomena that can be assimilated to the process of translation proper as a reference (Gadamer, Berman, Ricœur, Habermas, Chesterman, Bachmann-Medick, Guldin, Marais, etc.)...all these various uses of translation as a conceptual tool are but some of the many attempts at expanding the scope of its theorization.

Elsewhere (2016), I have called for the creation or the acknowledgement of a metatheoretical space in translation studies to account for these developments knowing that the mapping of the discipline (Holmes, 1972) is in continuing progress (van Doorslaer, 2007). But these efforts need to go further and take stock of these scattered but nonetheless converging conceptualizations of translation in a more encompassing interdisciplinary framework. Hence the proposed paper is meant to be an overview of an ongoing collective book project dedicated to outline the theoretical stakes of the said evolution and draw the broad lines of a philosophy of translation that would enable us to reveal the extent of its scope and potential impact on the relations between the so-called “three cultures” of knowledge (Kagan, 2009).

More specifically, this paper is aimed at explaining the focal concept that has come out of our metatheoretical reflection, i.e. the concept of “Arch-Translation”. What is it, what is its scope and how did we come to devise it?

Qu’est-ce que l’arché-traduction?

La traductologie a récemment subi des développements très profonds qui peuvent conduire cette discipline à une implosion, ou - pour le moins - à une restructuration radicale. Bien que conforme à une tendance générale dans d'autres cultures épistémiques vers des portées théoriques plus englobantes, l'évolution des dernières années a déplacé le concept de traduction pour être identifié au sein d’un nombre croissant de domaines de connaissance et jouer un plus grand rôle dans la manière de construire la réalité. Que le concept de traduction soit vu comme un mécanisme sociologique (Bourdieu, Luhmann, ANT) ou comme l'incarnation de rapports de force linguistiques, culturels et / ou juridiques asymétriques (postcolonialisme) ou encore comme une métaphore de divers phénomènes assimilables au processus de traduction propre comme référence (Gadamer, Berman, Ricœur, Habermas, Chesterman, Bachmann-Medick, Guldin, Marais, etc.) ... toutes ces diverses utilisations de la traduction comme outil conceptuel ne sont que quelques-unes des nombreuses tentatives d’élargir la portée de sa théorisation.

Ailleurs (2016), j'ai appelé à la création ou à la reconnaissance d'un espace métathéorique dans les études de traduction pour rendre compte de ces évolutions sachant que la cartographie de la discipline (Holmes, 1972) est en progression continue (van Doorslaer, 2007). Mais ces efforts doivent aller plus loin et faire le point sur ces conceptualisations dispersées mais néanmoins convergentes de la traduction dans un cadre interdisciplinaire plus englobant. Par conséquent, l'article proposé se veut une vue d'ensemble d'un projet de livre collectif en cours dédié à esquisser les enjeux théoriques de ladite évolution et à tracer les grandes lignes d'une philosophie de la traduction qui nous permettrait de révéler l'étendue de sa portée et son impact potentiel sur les relations entre les dites «trois cultures» de la connaissance (Kagan, 2009).

Plus précisément, cet article vise à expliquer le concept focal issu de notre réflexion métathéorique, c'est-à-dire le concept d '«Arché-Traduction». De quoi s'agit-il? Quelle est sa portée pour la discipline et comment en sommes-nous arrivés à le concevoir?

Teaching with Untranslatables in The Beast and the Sovereign Volume I

Samir Haddad, Fordham University, USA

At the end of “The Energy of Untranslatables,” Barbara Cassin claims that “What we need to promote is a whole new kind of teaching in languages,” one based on the thinking animating her Dictionary of Untranslatables. I respond to this call by arguing that a model for teaching with untranslatables in philosophy is found in Jacques Derrida’s seminars. Cassin frequently invokes the definition of deconstruction as “plus d’une langue,” and this phrase captures well the consequences that follow from a focus on untranslatables – they call us to consider more than one language in our philosophical thinking, and challenge the presupposition that a language can be properly called “one.” It is this double consequence, I propose, that we see in play in The Beast and the Sovereign Vol. I. In the final session of this seminar, Derrida states that “at bottom everything we have spoken about came down to problems of translation,” and he goes on to discuss issues related to translation and untranslatability. But more than a meditation on translation, we find across this seminar the practice of using untranslatables as pedagogical tools. Derrida focuses on an untranslatable element from French in several sessions, whether this be, among others, the gendered dimensions of “la bête et le souverain,” the idiomatic phrases “à pas de loup” and “faire savoir,” and the words “fond,” “bête,” and “bêtise.” Derrida also engages with a number of untranslatable words from other languages, including “stupidity,” “Dummheit,” and “Fremde.” It is these two pedagogical strategies – focusing on untranslatables within the language in which one is teaching (showing that no language can be called “one”), as well as bringing untranslatables from other languages into one’s teaching (showing that there is always more than one language at play in philosophical thinking) – that I analyze.

Enseigner avec des intraduisibles dans La bête et le souverain, volume I

À la fin de “L’énergie des intraduisibles,” Barbara Cassin déclare que « C’est tout un type d’enseignement des langues qu’il faut promouvoir », fondé sur la pensée qui anime son Vocabulaire européen des philosophies. Je réponds à cet appel en faisant valoir qu’un modèle d’enseignement avec des intraduisibles en philosophie se trouve dans les séminaires de Jacques Derrida. Cassin invoque souvent la définition de la déconstruction comme « plus d’une langue »; l’attention particulière prêtée aux intraduisibles, de fait, nous invite à prendre en considération plus d'une langue dans notre pensée philosophique, et remet en cause le présupposé selon lequel une langue peut être proprement considérée comme « une ». Je suggère que c’est cette double conséquence qui se joue dans La bête et le souverain vol. I. Lors de la dernière séance de son séminaire, Derrida affirmait qu’« au fond tout ce dont nous avons parlé revenait à des problèmes de traduction », en discutant de questions liées à la traduction et à l'intraduisibilité. Mais plus qu'une méditation sur la traduction, on trouve à travers ce séminaire l'utilisation d’intraduisibles comme outils pédagogiques. Derrida se concentre sur un élément intraduisible de la langue française au cours de plusieurs séances, qu'il s'agisse, entre autres, du genre dans « la bête et le souverain », ou des expressions idiomatiques « à pas de loup » et « faire savoir », ou encore des mots « fond », « bête », et « bêtise ». Il s'intéresse également aux intraduisibles issus d'autres langues : « stupidity », « Dummheit », ou « Fremde ». Ces deux stratégies pédagogiques constituent l’objet de mon analyse : d’une part, l’intérêt porté aux intraduisibles au sein de la langue dans laquelle on enseigne (montrer qu'aucune langue ne peut être appelée « une »), et d’autre part, l'introduction d’intraduisibles issus d'autres langues dans cet enseignement (montrer ainsi qu'il y a toujours plus d’une langue en jeu dans la pensée philosophique).

The right time of being late: Some reflections on the affinity between philosophy and translation

Saša Hrnjez, University of Padua, Italy

My aim in this paper is to investigate the link between philosophy and translation by means of a specific philosophical problem – temporality. Translation is usually considered as activity, process or its result that comes after an original creation of a text which has the status of the source. The temporality of translation resides therefore in its being-after or even coming-late. Does this common-sense vision of translation as emerging after something else that is preceding and original corresponds to the intimate nature of translation? In the first part of the paper, I will take into consideration the seminal Walter Benjamin’s text The Task of the Translator where German philosopher conceptualized a peculiar historical temporality of translation claiming that translation is later than the original, i.e., translation as the late fruit of the text. This Benjamin’s claim will be compared with another, famous Hegel’s assertion that philosophy always comes on the scene too late. What does it mean that both translation and philosophy are placed in the lateness? What are the advantages of this being-late? By addressing these questions, I would like to cast light on the affinity between philosophy as theoretical practice of interpretation and translation as cultural and linguistic activity of mediation. Does philosophy share the same temporal order with translation practice, namely, the temporality of delay? Is the history of philosophy nothing but a translational process between various philosophical traditions and ideas? In the last part of my presentation, I would like to outline certain features of philosophy of translation in order to differentiate it from other theoretical approaches to translation in the vast field of translation studies. The main thesis would be that philosophy of translation is only that perspective which envisages itself as akin to the very translational practice and not taking translation as an external object of the analysis.

Il tempo giusto di essere in ritardo: Alcune riflessioni sull'affinità tra filosofia e traduzione

Il mio obiettivo è quello di indagare il legame tra filosofia e traduzione attraverso un problema filosofico specifico - la temporalità. La traduzione viene di solito considerata come un'attività, un processo, o il suo risultato, che viene solo dopo la creazione originale di un testo, il testo di partenza. La temporalità della traduzione risiede quindi nel suo essere-dopo o addirittura nel suo venire-tardi. Questa visione della traduzione come emergente dopo qualcos'altro che è originale corrisponde alla natura intima della traduzione? Nella prima parte dell'articolo, prenderò in considerazione Il compito del traduttore di Walter Benjamin, in cui il filosofo tedesco concettualizza una peculiare temporalità storica della traduzione sostenendo che la traduzione è più tarda dell'originale, cioè essa è il frutto tardivo del testo. Questa affermazione di Benjamin sarà confrontata con un'altra, famosa affermazione di Hegel che la filosofia entra in scena sempre troppo tardi. Cosa significa che sia la traduzione che la filosofia sono collocate nel ritardo? Quali sono i vantaggi di questo essere in ritardo? Affrontando queste domande, vorrei far luce sull'affinità tra la filosofia come pratica teorica di interpretazione e la traduzione come attività culturale e linguistica di mediazione. La filosofia condivide lo stesso ordine temporale con la pratica della traduzione, cioè la temporalità del ritardo? La storia della filosofia non è altro che un processo di traduzione tra varie tradizioni e idee filosofiche? Nell'ultima parte della mia presentazione vorrei delineare alcune caratteristiche della filosofia della traduzione per differenziarla da altri approcci teorici alla traduzione nel vasto campo dei Translation studies. La tesi principale sarebbe che la filosofia della traduzione è solo quella prospettiva che si considera affine alla pratica traduttiva stessa e non prende la traduzione come un oggetto esterno dell'analisi.

The experience of the world and the illusion of transparency: Philosophy and the paradoxes of translation

Stephen Noble, Université de Lille, France

In what sense precisely do we as human beings inhabit language? And in what sense does our experience of the language we inhabit influence our experience of the world in which we dwell? For phenomenological philosophers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), and for writers such as T. E. Lawrence (1888–1935), upon whose work the French thinker drew, the relation between language and world is so intricate that, in the case of the former, the very idea of someone simultaneously inhabiting two languages, or two worlds, is unthinkable, and, in the case of the latter, it is enough to bring the person close to madness.

Although today one might be tempted to dismiss such points of view as being altogether too radical, we will ask, first of all, if there is not a truth which underlies them, one which is indeed relevant to the work, and life, of the translator, who, ideally, must inhabit at least two languages simultaneously. Secondly, we will ask if these viewpoints, albeit radical, might not be able to shed light on some of the most difficult aspects of translation, and notably of philosophical translations, namely instances where we confront elements of the text which appear untranslatable. For, in the case of philosophy, a concept or a notion which resists being rendered into another language can lead to an essential distortion not only of one particular meaning, but of a whole philosophical idea. Finally, and as we shall see, such distortions reveal some of the most serious pitfalls of what is untranslatable—or, in French, l’intraduisible—in the context of philosophical translations.

L’expérience du monde et l’illusion de la transparence : La philosophie et les paradoxes de la traduction

De quelle manière précisément, en tant qu’êtres humains, habitons-nous le langage ? Et de quelle manière l’expérience de la langue que nous habitons influe sur l’expérience du monde dans lequel nous demeurons ? Pour des phénoménologues tel Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), et pour des écrivains tel T. E. Lawrence (1888–1935), dont les écrits sont d’ailleurs cités par le philosophe français, le lien entre langage et monde est si complexe que l’idée de pouvoir appartenir à deux langues, ou à deux mondes, à la fois est, pour le premier, impensable, et pour le dernier, suffisant pour mener quelqu’un au bord de la folie.

Même si, de nos jours, on pourrait être tenté d’écarter de telles idées, en raison notamment de leur radicalité, nous demanderons, tout d’abord, si elles ne recèlent pas une certaine vérité, effectivement pertinente pour le travail, et la vie, du traducteur, qui doit habiter, dans l’idéal, au moins deux langues à la fois. Ensuite, nous demanderons si de telles idées, quoique radicales, ne pourraient pas éclaircir certains des aspects les plus difficiles de la traduction, en particulier de la traduction de la philosophie, à savoir des instances où nous faisons face à des fragments d’un texte qui paraissent intraduisibles. Car, dans le cas de la philosophie, un concept ou une notion qui résiste au passage d’une langue à une autre, peut produire une distorsion essentielle non seulement d’un sens en particulier, mais d’une idée philosophique en elle-même. Enfin, et comme nous le verrons, de telles distorsions révèlent certains des écueils les plus sérieux de l’intraduisible dans le contexte des traductions philosophiques.

Ghostly encounters: Derrida’s Specters of Marx and (re)translation

Ziling Bai, University of Manchester, England

The figure of the ghost has been gliding around the discourse about translation but has remained ungraspable and underexplored. Walter Benjamin considers translation as the ‘sur-vival’ or ‘afterlife’ of a text, which both hints at and downplays the possible death of the text and a form of being other than living. This life and death debate has been continued by Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida. Although translation scholars have been drawing theoretical foundation from Derridean deconstruction, they tend to focus on discourses specifically on translation, such as The Scene of Babel, while paying less attention to other works that discuss the concepts of textual demise and haunting e.g. Living on: border lines, Of Spirit, and particularly Specters of Marx. This paper aims to explore how the figure of the ghost and the concept of hauntology in Specters of Marx may inform Translation Studies, a nexus noticed by a few translation scholars, but to a limited extent and not by many.

Given that Specters of Marx has sparked off a spectral turn in contemporary cultural studies, and that Derrida’s oeuvre is believed to be related to translation, it is unexpected that Translation Studies remains relatively unfamiliar with the concept of spectre. However, this comment may not be entirely fair. In Translation Studies, the figure of the ghost has been cloaked by Différance, a concept of which Spectrality is an inheritor – the deferring and destabilizing power of Différance can be seen as a vortex that keeps generating otherwiseness and simulacra of the ‘actual’ being, which can be seen as spectres of that being. Therefore, one step forward to Spectrality may be revealing, given that Différance has already enabled translation scholars to see the differential and manifold meaning of texts, and thereby untranslatability, the dissolving boundary between the original and translations, among other issues.

This paper explores how the dead/undead tension engendered by the coming back of the spectre informs the relationship and hierarchy between source text and their (re)translations, as well as between (re)translations themselves. It delves into how this tension complicates the ethical issues coming from the heterogeneity and undecidability in the interpretation of source text and earlier (re)translations. Further, it probes into how the iterability of these repeated, different interpretations can expand on the theorization of re-translation. This theorization will be exemplified by the 1988, 2003 and 2020 [2015] Chinese translations of Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, itself a novel featuring a distinct ghostly encountering, in order to see how literary traces of the original versions of the novel and the earlier translations can be harboured, suppressed and/or released by the following (re)translations.

翻译与鬼魂 ——德里达《马克思的幽灵》与重译研究

在有关翻译的论述中，“鬼魂”这个概念一直隐隐地存在着，但难以捉摸，且少有人研究。瓦尔特·本雅明认为，翻译是原文生命的延续（也有人理解为来世/重生），暗指了文本在翻译中可能变为某种非生命的状态。基于本雅明，保罗·德曼和雅克·德里达对翻译中文本的生死境遇进行了讨论。尽管翻译学者已经从德里达解构主义中汲取了一些理论基础，但他们主要着眼于德里达的几篇明确关于翻译的作品，比如《巴别塔》《什么是相关的翻译》等，而较少关注《活下去：边界线》《论精神:海德格尔与问题》，尤其是《马克思的幽灵》这些在文本生命上着墨较多的著作。本文探讨《马克思的幽灵》中“幽灵性”和“鬼魂”的概念如何让我们更好地理解和构建翻译学理论。这个议题已经被一些翻译学者关注，但有关它的讨论还不够广泛。

一般认为，德里达的所有著作都可以做翻译学相关的解读。尽管《马克思的幽灵》在文化研究领域掀起了幽灵性讨论浪潮，但出人意料的是，翻译研究对这个概念还不是很熟悉——其实也不尽然——在翻译学中，“鬼魂”这个概念是存在的，它一直躲在“延异”的外衣下——“鬼魂”可以理解为“延异”的延续——“延异”像一个涡旋，不断产生异质性和仿真物，即一个事物的鬼魂。既然“延异”已经让翻译学者看到了文本解读的多样性和不可译性，也让其认识到原文和译文之间的界限是模糊的，那么如果更进一步谈谈幽灵性和翻译学之间的联系，或许能有更多发现。

幽灵性致使一种存在与消亡的共存，这种共存是带有争议的。本文将论述这种不乏争议的共存对原文和译文之间、不同译文之间的关系有何启发，探讨对原文、之前版本译文解读的异质性与不可确定性所产生的问题。本文还研究幽灵性之文本“可重复性”将如何致力于重译理论的扩建——1988，2003和2020（2015）年汉译本弗吉尼亚·伍尔芙《到灯塔去》将为这项理论扩建提供例证，呈现小说原文和之前译文中的文学印迹如何在不同译本中被隐藏，抑制以及得到释放。值得一提的是，《到灯塔去》这本小说也有许多关于幽灵的描述。